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Preview of 1996 Survey
Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1996).
In this case of first impression, a wife claimed that pursuant to
R.I. Gen. Laws section 15-5-16.11 she is entitled to recover ali-
mony and a portion of her husband's estate, including the in-
creased earning capacity from an advanced degree the husband
obtained during their marriage. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
disagreed and followed the majority of states in holding that a pro-
fessional degree or license is not a marital asset subject to equita-
ble distribution.2 The court explained that finding otherwise
would foreclose consideration of future events, such as death or ill-
ness, which could affect an individual's earning capacity. Pres-
ently, New York's high court is the only state supreme court to
subject a professional degree or license to equitable distribution.3
Despite the court's decision in Becker, Rhode Island appears to
have joined New York in recognizing a professional degree as mari-
tal property. Although not applicable to this case, since the Beck-
ers filed for divorce in 1989, the Rhode Island General Assembly
enacted an amended section 15-5-16.1 on July 21, 1992, which re-
pealed the assignment of property statute the supreme court relied
on in Becker. This new statute states that in making an equitable
distribution, the court shall consider "the contribution by one (1)
party to the education, training, licensure, business or increased
earning power of the other[.]" 4
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1 (1988 Reenactment). Section 15-5-16.1(a)
states in part that "[i]n addition to or in lieu of an order to pay alimony made
pursuant to a complaint for divorce, the court may assign to either the husband or
wife a portion of the estate of the other." R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a) (1988
Reenactment).
2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wyoming as support for their holding. Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524,
531 (R.I. 1996).
3. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985) (holding a license to
practice medicine acquired during the marriage was a marital asset subject to dis-
tribution). In arriving at this decision the New York Court of Appeals relied on
Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) which states that in considering the dis-
tribution of marital property a court shall consider the expenditures and contribu-
tions made to the career of the other party. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(5)(d)(6)
(McKinney 1986).
4. 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 269, § 2 (a)(9).
SURVEY SECTION
State v. One Lot of $8,560 in U.S. Currency, 670 A.2d 772
(R.I. 1996).
According to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."1 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the State's attempt to seize
the proceeds of illegal drug transactions through civil proceedings,
when the assets are claimed by one who has already been crimi-
nally convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The
court adopted the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Halper2 and ruled that "a defendant who already
has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected
to an additional civil sanction to the extent" that the civil forfeiture
is punitive, rather than remedial in nature.3 Accordingly, in the
civil proceeding the state is entitled to recover up to the approxi-
mate amount of damage which resulted from the criminal activity
without implicating the Double-Jeopardy clause. 4 To require the
defendant to pay more would be a penalty, constituting Double-
Jeopardy. Among the factors the superior court may consider are
the cost of apprehending and prosecuting the defendants, as well
as the cost of probationary supervision.5
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
3. State v. One Lot of $8,560 in U.S. Currency, 670 A.2d 772, 773 (R.I. 1996)
(quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49).
4. Id. at 773.
5. Id. at 776.
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Pound Hill Corp., Inc. v. Perl, 668 A.2d 1260 (R.I. 1996).
A purchaser of real estate filed suit against defendants, who
had earlier unsuccessfully attempted to purchase the same parcel
of land. Prior to suit, the defendants had filed numerous actions in
an effort to prevent the plaintiff from developing residential hous-
ing on the land they had purchased. 1 In vacating the trial court's
grant of summary judgement in favor of the defendants on charges
of abuse of process and interference with an advantageous rela-
tionship, the Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged the
United States Supreme Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine 2 which
protects a person's First Amendment right to petition the govern-
ment for the redress of grievances.3 While the Rhode Island
Supreme Court recognized this doctrine, the court also recognized
its exception.4 The "sham exception" requires that "[flirst the law-
suit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits."5 Second,
the court "should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals
'an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor,'.., through the 'use [of] the governmental process -
as opposed to the outcome of that process.' "6 Based on this excep-
tion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ordered that the summary
judgement entered in favor of the defendants be vacated and re-
manded the case to the superior court for further proceedings. 7
1. Among the actions filed by the defendants was a complaint alleging that
the plaintiff had not received a three-fifths vote to rezone the land. This action
was filed six days after the plaintiff had received a four-fifths vote.
2. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arose from two United States Supreme
Court cases in the 1960's. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961).
3. Pound Hill Corp., Inc. v. Perl, 668 A.2d 1260, 1263 (R.I. 1996).
4. Pound Hill, 668 A.2d at 1264-65.
5. The exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, known as the "sham ex-
ception," was established by the United States Supreme Court in California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
6. Id. (alteration in original)(citation omitted).
7. Pound Hill Corp, Inc., v. Perl, 668 A.2d 1260, 1264 (R.I. 1996) (quoting
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920, 1928 (1993)).
SURVEY SECTION
Giroux v. Purington Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Gustafson Steel
Erectors, Inc., 670 A.2d 1227 (R.I. 1996).
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-
stitution, federal bankruptcy laws preempt state bankruptcy stat-
utes.1 Despite this well-known principle of law, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court ruled that R.I. Gen. Laws section 27-7-2.4, which
allows a person to file a complaint directly against the insurer of
an alleged tortfeasor whenever the alleged tortfeasor files for bank-
ruptcy, is not preempted by federal bankruptcy law.2
The supreme court rejected the defendant manufacturer's ar-
gument that relief from the automatic stay provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is a condition precedent under section 27-7-2.4 to the
substitution of the insurance company. Looking to the unambigu-
ous language of section 27-7-2.4, the court ruled that the tort-fea-
sor's filing for bankruptcy is the only condition to the insurance
company being substituted as defendant. The court also rejected
the defendant's preemption argument that if the debtor's assets
are not protected, namely its insurance policy, the aims of the
bankruptcy laws will be frustrated. The supreme court explained
that the plaintiff is the only claimant to the debtor's liability-insur-
ance policy and reasoned that when there is only one claimant to
the insurance policy, substituting the insurance company as the
defendant will not result in financial harm to any of the debtor's
other creditors.
1. Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to
establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States[.]" U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. Section 27-7-2.4 states "[any person, having a claim because of damages
of any kind caused by the tort of any other person, may file a complaint directly
against the liability insurer of the alleged tort-feasor seeking compensation by way
of a judgment for money damages whenever the alleged tort-feasor files for bank-
ruptcy, involving a reorganization for the benefit of creditors or a wage earner
plan, provided that the complaining party shall not recover an amount in excess of
the insurance coverage available for the tort complained of." R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-
7-2.4 (1994 Reenactment).
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Jennings v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 669 A.2d 534 (R.I. 1996).
Plaintiffs, who were injured as a result of a traffic accident,
collected medical payments pursuant to an insurance policy they
had with the defendant insurance company. According to the
terms of their policy, plaintiffs granted the insurance company a
subrogation interest in any judgment or settlement received from
the other driver. Subsequently, plaintiffs reached a settlement
agreement with the other driver's insurance company. As a result
of this settlement agreement, the plaintiffs incurred substantial
attorney's fees and argued that the insurance company must pay
its pro rata share of their fees before collecting their subrogation
interest.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized the subroga-
tion doctrine whereby a party, such as an insurer, who pays the
expenses of another may be substituted for that person and ac-
quire their legal rights.' The Rhode Island Supreme Court fol-
lowed Oregon's lead2 and held that if the insurance company
received a benefit from the settlement agreement, it should be re-
quired to contribute a proportional amount of the expenses in-
curred. This case was remanded for the superior court to
determine the extent plaintiffs' settlement agreement benefitted
the defendant insurance company.
Michael W. Field
1. United States Inv. and Dev. Corp. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Human Serv.,
606 A.2d 1314 (R.I. 1992); Hospital Serv. Corp. of Rhode Island v. Pennsylvania
Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967).
2. In a similar case to the one at bar, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a
subrogated insurer is required to pay reasonable and necessary attorney's fees if
the insurer received a benefit. Jennings v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 669 A.2d 534, 536
(R.I. 1996) (citing Ridenour v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 541 P.2d 1377 (Or. 1975)).
